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Richards, E., and B. O’Brien. Misreading Scripture with Western Eyes. Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2012. 220 pp. Paper, $16.00.
The authors of this book are apparently student and teacher, both from a
conservative, evangelical background. Thus the book offers reflection on
practice.
When I was part of the pastoral team in a large multicultural church in
the Washington, DC, area, we pastors envied pastors of (presumably) allWhite “First churches” down the road from us. This book is written for those
churches making the transition from mono-cultural to multi-cultural. And
since multicultural congregations are increasingly the norm, this book will
be helpful to Christians worshiping in multicultural settings and to pastors
of these congregations. It will also be useful to those leading out in home
missions and short-term mission trips.
Beginning with easier topics, such as race and language, it progresses
to more difficult topics: individualism, shame/honor, time, and the selfcenteredness of North American (church) culture.
In all, this volume will help Westerners take a studied look at themselves
and how they read the Bible, in helpful contrast to the intentions of the
writers.
Each chapter ends with a list of “Points to Ponder,” which will guide
conversations and study groups. The last (unnumbered) chapter offers the
reader five recommendations to becoming a multicultural congregation.
Berrien Springs, Michigan			

Bruce Campbell Moyer

Stump, Eleonore. Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. xix + 668 pp. Hardcover, $110.
Eleonore Stump says she has wanted to write this book all her adult life
(vi). It brings to fruition years of reflection on the topic and incorporates
material from various series of lectures, including the Gifford Lectures
of 2003, with which it shares its title. In view of its sweeping scope and
meticulous construction, Wandering in Darkness certainly rates as one of the
most important books on the topic to appear in recent years.
“Wandering” may aptly describe the experience of suffering, but it hardly
applies to this discussion. Like an experienced guide, Stump takes her readers
on a well-planned itinerary at a deliberate pace. She tells us just where we are
going at the outset, reminds us of our destination at regular intervals, and
carefully explains what everything she directs attention to contributes to our
progress.
On the other hand, the word “problem” correctly identifies the
philosophical objective of the book. Its overarching purpose is to provide an
effective response to the problem of evil, the challenge that suffering poses to
the credibility of theism. Invoking a familiar philosophical distinction, Stump
repeatedly asserts that her objective is to provide a defense, not a theodicy. In
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contrast to a theodicy, which seeks to provide morally sufficient reasons for
God to allow suffering in this world, a defense seeks only to describe a possible
world that contains both God and suffering. And whereas the claims of a
successful theodicy must be true, it is sufficient for an adequate defense if its
claims may be true (19, 155, 377, 389).
Stump is also specific as to the sort of suffering she has in mind. Suffering
comes in many forms, from animal pain to genocide, but her concern here
is not the suffering of sentient beings in general, but only the suffering of
“mentally fully functional human beings” (4, 378).
To construct the general framework of her defense, Stump employs the
thought of Thomas Aquinas, in particular his view of the human good (81).
On Aquinas’s account, the ultimate proper object of love is God; the ultimate
good for any human person is shared union with God (95); and the ultimate
end of the love of persons is “union with God shared in the union with other
human beings” (91). Love can achieve its goal, however, only if the one loved is
undivided, and the perpetual obstacle to love in human experience is a “willed
loneliness,” which results in a divided self. Neither God nor other human
persons can enjoy union with someone who is alienated from herself (156).
God’s remedy for this universal post-Fall affliction, as Aquinas describes it,
is a surrender to divine grace. Operative grace is active in divine justification;
cooperative grace, in sanctification. Together, they bring about the moral and
spiritual regeneration “which is requisite for internal integration, which is
necessary for all love” (172).
For Aquinas, suffering plays an integral role in this healing process. It is
“God’s medicine for the psychic disorder of post-Fall human beings.” And
because suffering helps to “ward off the worst things” that can happen to
us—isolation from God—and “provide the best thing”—“glory in shared
union with God” (398-401), there are “morally sufficient reasons” for God
to allow it (396).
Helpful as Aquinas’s thought is in addressing the problem of suffering,
Stump says there are important facets of the experience that he does not
account for. Besides a loving union with God and others, human flourishing
also requires something quite different, namely, “the desires of the heart”
(Ps 37:4-5), and suffering results when someone fails to get the desires of
her heart or has and loses her heart’s desire (7). A successful defense must
therefore envision a way for us to achieve the desires of our hearts in a world
where suffering interferes.
To do this, Stump argues, we must go beyond conventional analytic
philosophy, with its preoccupation with knowledge. Since desires of the
heart are intensely personal, the suffering involved in losing them is intensely
personal as well, and we can grasp its distinctive qualities only by looking
at the experience of individual, concrete sufferers. This is why narratives
are essential to the sort of defense that Stump has in mind. Only narrative
makes available second-person knowledge, or “Franciscan knowledge” (51),
that is, intimate or shared knowledge of another person’s experience. As the
discovery of mirror neurons demonstrates, human beings are capable of
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sharing, indeed participating in, the experiences of other persons (69-71);
and personal stories, or narratives, are the means by which such knowledge
becomes available.
Stump considers the loss of the heart’s desires in the biblical narratives
of four representative figures—Job, Abraham, Samson, and Mary of Bethany.
Taken together, she maintains, these four characters provide “an iconic
representation of the panoply of human suffering,” in which all the modes
of suffering are present. In their stories we find the pain and agony of the
innocent victim, the evil of self-destruction, the heartsickness of losing what
one loves the most, and the misery of being unwanted and shamed (375). In
their “messy richness,” these accounts “inform in subtle ways our intuition
and judgments, just as real-life experiences do” (373). These stories do much
more than illustrate abstract philosophical points. They provide direct insight
into the actual experience of suffering.
Not only do these four narratives reveal the distinctive qualities of
individual sufferings, they also show that sufferers who are originally denied
their heart’s desires may ultimately achieve these desires within a personal
relationship with God. “[W]hen a person weaves her heart’s desires into
a deepest desire for God,” Stump says, “it is possible for those desires to
be transformed [. . .] so that even the worst external circumstances are not
sufficient to prevent their being satisfied somehow in the union of love with
God” (473). What the sufferer thought he or she most wanted, and failed to
realize, is ultimately gained in “refolded” form within an intimate, secondperson, relationship with God. In a union with God, each sufferer does, in
fact, find the desires of his or her heart fulfilled. Remarkably, “the suffering
that breaks the heart yields for the sufferer the desires of her heart” (479).
Moreover, within this intimate relationship with God, mirabile dictu, not
only does the sufferer achieve a new form of what was lost, what he or she
ultimately achieves seems to the sufferer “more worth having than what she
originally hoped for” (473). Mary of Bethany, for example, enjoys a reunion
with her brother Lazarus that is richer than what she hoped for before Jesus
raised him from the dead. What Samson gained in his relationship to God
at the end of his life was greater than everything he lost through betrayal
and humiliation. And to cite a nonbiblical example, after the one thing John
Milton desired more than all else, viz., the triumph of the Puritan cause, was
lost, he wrote the majestic poetry for which he is known. But in that poetry,
which would not have come about had Puritanism succeeded, the movement
he cherished achieved an expression that was arguably greater than what his
original vision entailed (469).
This concept of the way in which the desires of a person’s heart may
ultimately be received returns us to the essential theme of the Thomistic
defense, and the integration of these two components completes Stump’s
response to the problem of suffering. Recall that for Aquinas the supreme
human good, the essential requirement for human flourishing, is union with
God. With the realization that the desires of the heart can ultimately be
fulfilled in intimate relationship to God, we find a defense that addresses both
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concerns. Within an intimate connection with God a person can realize both
the fulfillment of human flourishing and the achievement of one’s heart’s
desire. “When a person takes God as her deepest desire, what is highest on
the scale of objective value and what is deepest on the scale of subjective
value for her becomes the same for her.” This weaves into a unity all the
things a person cares about, her flourishing and all her heart’s desires, which
she now desires as gifts of God (449).
In sum, the Thomistic defense, when complemented by the insights
contained in biblical narratives, provides an answer to “the central question”
that suffering poses to religious belief ” (455). There are, indeed, morally
sufficient reasons for God to allow suffering.
By any standard, Wandering in Darkness is a remarkable achievement, well
deserving of the generous praise it has received. It presents the work of a
mature scholar addressing a fundamental philosophical question, drawing
on a lifetime of careful research, thoroughly conversant with all the relevant
discussions of the topic, as well as the various subtopics and secondary issues
surrounding it. Moreover, the discussion is not merely informed, informative,
and intellectually stimulating; it is personally moving. It obviously flows from
the author’s profound investment in the issue, and it is virtually impossible
not to be drawn into the sort of personal concern that radiates from its pages.
Impressive as it is, this proposal, as do all treatments of suffering, leaves
us with some lingering questions. One concerns the limited scope of the
suffering Stump addresses, given the extensive, not to say elaborate, nature
of her argument. Granted, one cannot do everything in a single book, as
she says; but even though it is certainly worthwhile to address the suffering
of fully functioning adults, there are other forms of suffering that pose
enormous obstacles to theism. The suffering of children and the horror of
the Holocaust, for example, are frequently cited as the most obvious reasons
to question God’s existence. One wonders how the defense Stump formulates
would address such phenomena.
Another concern involves the limited time frame that factors into Stump’s
defense. In their well-known responses to the problems that suffering presents
to theism, Marilyn McCord Adams and John Hick invoke the concept that
human life will continue beyond death and that it is in the life to come that
the negative effects of suffering will ultimately be redeemed. Granted, Stump
seems to hold out the possibility that this is where some will finally enjoy
union with God (Job’s first ten children, for example), but the idea does not
play a significant role in these reflections. Instead, the sufferings of the four
figures that receive her detailed attention—Job, Abraham, Samson, and Mary
of Bethany—all experienced an intimate union with God before their earthly
lives ended.
Then there is a question that seems to hover over every attempt to reduce
suffering as an obstacle to belief in God. Is the net effect of suffering’s presence
in the world ultimately positive or negative? Granted, Stump maintains that
some good things are irrevocably lost in this life, and the hope provided by
the stories she analyzes and the Thomistic defense she appeals to is “the
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redemption of evil, not its elimination” (479, cf. 256). But she also maintains
that the sufferer will regard the benefits eventually acquired following the loss
of her heart’s desire “more worth having” than what she originally hoped for.
If so, we have to ask if anything of real significance is truly lost. If the good
things that eventually follow, and necessarily presuppose, suffering prevent
us from regretting that it ever happened, one has to wonder if its net effect
is really negative. In spite of Stump’s insistence that suffering is essentially
negative and must be opposed and resisted, her defense leaves me with the
impression that the potential gains that follow suffering outweigh the loss it
involves.
But this presents us with a dilemma that seems to attach to any defense
or theodicy. The more we emphasize the negativity and horror of suffering,
the less effective our attempts to defuse its power will seem. Conversely, the
more effective our responses to suffering become, the more we appear to
minimize its negative character. Wandering in Darkness leaves me wondering
if, in Stump’s scheme of things, the particular benefits to which suffering
can lead within one’s intimacy with God ultimately outweigh the pain of the
suffering itself. I see a similarity here to Marilyn McCord Adams’s view that
horrendous evils will be ultimately defeated because their victims will come
to see them as making an irreplaceable and indispensable contribution to their
intimate relationship with God.
The neglected alternative is that, whatever gains may come about in
the wake of suffering, its presence in the world involves a net loss. In other
words, our present world is a tragic world. The distinctive goods that could
only be realized in the wake of suffering do not, in the final analysis, lead
to its “defeat” in the way that some have argued. Instead, the world would
have been better, all things considered, had suffering never come about. To
some, this will seem to limit or detract from the power of God to overcome
suffering and/or to underestimate, if not undermine, the good things that
can be achieved in response to it. But elevating the potential benefits that can
come about through suffering—or if not exactly through suffering, through
creative responses to suffering—seems to minimize the negativity of the
experience and turn it into something ultimately beneficial.
Whatever her response to such concerns might be, there is no doubt
that Stump’s remarkable achievement will attract admiration and stimulate
discussion for years to come.
Loma Linda University				

Richard Rice

Ulrich, Eugene. The Biblical Qumran Scrolls: Transcriptions and Textual Variants,
vols. 1-3. Leiden: Brill, 2013. xvi + 796 pp. Paper, $99.
It was in the extremely sensitive political situation of post-WWII Palestine,
right before the outbreak of the 1948 war, that the first manuscripts were
discovered close to Qumran near the Dead Sea and Jericho. The Bedouin
Muhammed edh-Dhib was the first to accidentally find the first three scrolls,

